Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge
Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Edward Feser, Aristotle's Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science. Among the many topics covered are the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of evolution; and neuroscientific reductionism. The book interacts heavily with the literature on these issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science, so as to bring contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition.
Immortal Souls
Immortal Souls provides as ambitious and complete a defense of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical anthropology as is currently in print. Among the many topics covered are the reality and unity of the self, the immateriality of the intellect, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, the critique of artificial intelligence, and the refutation of both Cartesian and materialist conceptions of human nature. Along the way, the main rival positions in contemporary philosophy and science are thoroughly engaged with and rebutted. Reviews "Edward Feser's book is a Summa of the nature of the human person: it is, therefore, both a rather long – but brilliant – monograph, and a valuable work for consultation. Each of the human faculties discussed is treated comprehensively, with a broad range of theories considered for and against, and, although Feser's conclusions are firmly Thomistic, one can derive great benefit from his discussions even if one is not a convinced hylomorphist. Every philosopher of mind would benefit from having this book within easy reach." Howard Robinson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Central European University "Feser defends the Aristotelian and Thomistic system, effectively bringing it into dialogue with recent debates and drawing on some of the best of both analytic (Kripke, Searle, BonJour, Fodor) and phenomenological (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus) philosophy. He deftly rebuts objections to Thomism, both ancient and modern. Anyone working today on personal identity, the unity of the self, the semantics of cognition, free will, or qualia will need to engage with the analysis and arguments presented here." Robert C. Koons, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin.
James Dominic Rooney
Material Objects in Confucian and Aristotelian Metaphysics: The Inevitability of Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism is a metaphysical theory that explains the unity of material objects through a special immaterial part, a 'form'. While contemporary accounts of hylomorphism appeal to structure, and advocate that material substances can have other substances as parts, James Dominic Rooney highlights the flaws in this Neo-Aristotelian way of thinking. Instead, he draws on medieval European and Chinese traditions to put forward that the classical approach to the unity of material objects in terms of 'form' remains theoretically superior.
Rooney shows how Thomas Aquinas' account of form gives a more coherent version of hylomorphism, eliminating the need for substance parts. He also studies the Song dynasty Confucian thinker Zhu Xi's hylomorphic intuition that whatever accounts for the composition of some parts into a material whole is a metaphysical part of that object. By appealing to the same non-Aristotelian considerations as Zhu Xi, Rooney explains why all those who believe in the unity of material objects will appeal to a form, enabling hylomorphism to remain a plausible framework. In doing so, this book shines new light on a classic philosophical problem in contemporary metaphysics and demonstrates the far-reaching points of theoretical contact between Western and Confucian thought.
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