Quaestio: Whether things possess being of themselves
Videtur quod things possess being of themselves.
- It seems that every thing which exists possesses within itself the principle by which it is what it is. For whatever is something must have a nature whereby it is constituted in its own being. Therefore, if a thing exists, its nature must possess svabhāva, that is, an intrinsic and self-subsistent nature.
- Further, whatever is produced from causes eventually arrives at something which exists through itself. For if everything depended upon another, there would be an infinite regress of causes, and nothing would exist. Therefore, things must ultimately possess an intrinsic nature that does not depend upon other things.
- Further, opposites cannot both belong to the same thing in the same respect. But things are distinguished from one another precisely by possessing determinate natures. Therefore, the nature of each thing must possess a determinate and intrinsic reality by which it is distinguished from other things.
- Further, if things were empty of intrinsic nature, then knowledge would be impossible. For the intellect knows what a thing is through its essence. Therefore, things must possess intrinsic essences which can be known by the intellect.
Sed contra.
Nagarjuna says that whatever arises dependently does not arise from itself. For that which exists through itself would not require another as its cause. But all conditioned things arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. Therefore, no conditioned thing possesses an absolutely self-subsistent nature.
Moreover, nothing which is composed of relations and conditions can be absolutely independent of those relations and conditions. But all finite things are constituted in determinate ways through relations to other things. Therefore, no finite thing possesses svabhāva understood as an absolutely independent and self-grounding essence.
Respondeo dicendum quod the claim that things possess svabhāva must be distinguished according to two meanings.
In one sense, svabhāva may signify the proper nature of a thing, by which it is what it is. In this sense, finite things truly possess natures. A human being is truly human; a tree is truly a tree; and fire is truly fire. To deny this would destroy the intelligibility of created things.
But in another sense, svabhāva signifies a nature possessing being entirely from itself, independently of every cause, relation, condition, and act of participation. In this sense, no finite thing possesses svabhāva.
For whatever is finite cannot be its own act of being. Its essence and its act of being are distinct. Therefore, whatever a finite thing is, it receives existence rather than being existence itself.
Thus the mistake lies in confusing having a nature with being self-subsistent through one’s nature.
Aquinas would therefore reformulate Nagarjuna’s central insight as follows:
No finite being is ipsum esse.
No finite being possesses existence from itself.
Every finite being is dependent upon causes and conditions both for its coming-to-be and, more fundamentally, for its being.
Consequently, the denial of svabhāva need not mean that things are unreal. It means rather that they are not self-sufficient realities.
Their being is participated, not possessed absolutely.
Therefore, the things of this world are neither absolutely self-subsistent nor sheer nothingness. They are beings by participation.
This provides a metaphysical interpretation of śūnyatā: the emptiness of finite things consists not in their non-existence, but in their lack of independent, self-grounding existence.
Ad primum. A nature explains what a thing is, but it does not thereby explain why that thing exists. The essence of a human being is not the act of existence by which the human being is. Therefore, having a nature does not entail possessing existence from oneself.
Ad secundum. The denial of svabhāva does not require an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes. Rather, precisely because finite things do not possess existence through themselves, the order of participated being ultimately requires that which possesses being through itself. This is not another conditioned thing, but ipsum esse subsistens.
Ad tertium. Things are genuinely distinct through their forms and natures. But their distinction does not make them absolutely independent. A creature can possess a determinate nature while remaining radically dependent upon the cause of its existence.
Ad quartum. The intelligibility of things does not require them to possess self-subsistent being. The intellect can know a creature’s essence precisely because the creature possesses a real nature. But the intellect must distinguish the question quid est?—what is it?—from an est?—whether it exists. The essence known by the intellect does not contain within itself the sufficient reason for its existence.
Conclusion: Nāgārjuna’s critique of svabhāva, expressed in Thomistic terms, can be understood as the claim that no finite essence is its own sufficient ontological ground. Thomism, however, goes beyond Nāgārjuna by affirming that the dependence of finite beings ultimately terminates in God, who alone is not merely a being possessing an essence but subsistent Being itself (ipsum esse subsistens).
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