Sunday, March 09, 2014

鈴木 貞一 計算の間違い

鈴木 貞一(すずき ていいち、1888年(明治21年)12月16日 - 1989年


開戦1年目 80万トン/96万トン 二年目 60万トン/169万トン 三年目 70万トン/392万トン と
前者の予想を遙かに超えた数字が並ぶ結果になりました。(注 予想/自損害)


昭和16年11月5日 御前会議

原 枢密院議長  >南洋の敵艦の妨害を受けても物資輸送に影響は無いと判断して宜しいか?
永野 軍令部総長 >海上輸送は日本の生命線でありますので、その保護には力を尽くすが損害もある程度あるでしょう。
原 枢密院議長  >米英蘭の海軍に妨害された場合は?
鈴木貞一  企画院総裁 >船舶の損耗数は陸海軍共同の研究の結果であります。

The key was lost and the safe remained locked for 22 years after the 1989 death of its owner, former Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki of the Imperial Japanese Army, who had been the last surviving Class-A war criminal of World War II.

Suzuki, who died at the age of 100 in Shibayama, Chiba Prefecture, was among key Cabinet members when Japan started the Pacific War with the Dec. 7, 1941, surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Two years ago, Suzuki's relatives had NHK open the safe. Inside were diaries, notebooks and other documents, including a 16-page typed manuscript that the general had read out in front of Emperor Hirohito and national leaders at an Imperial Conference on Nov. 5, 1941, to detail Japan's logistical strengths.

According to Moriyama, Suzuki apparently adopted an earlier optimistic simulation provided by the navy that assumed that as the war continued, fewer transport ships would be sunk. The simulation was based on outdated World War I ship-loss data and didn't assume any damage from enemy aircraft.

"Whether Japan would be able to continue the war depended on how much (shipping) we would lose," Gen. Kenryo Sato, the army's military affairs chief in the 1940s, wrote in a memoir published in 1976.

"In reality, the estimated amount turned out to be far off the mark. This was the biggest cause of our defeat" in the Pacific War, Sato wrote.

Suzuki was well aware of the huge gap between the industrial strength of the U.S. and that of Japan, and was among a few members who initially openly argued against a war with the United States.


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